Introduction
Two international courts, two diff erent personalities, two diff erent procedures. One of these courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), is the highest judicial body of the European Union (EU). Its seat is in Luxembourg. Th e other, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), is the high court that handles issues arising under the European Convention on Human Rights. Th us its membership is much broader; it includes, to be sure, all of the members of the European Union, because all of them have signed on to the Convention: but it includes the other signatories as well, whether part of the EU or not; Russia, Norway, and the Baltic countries, for example. Each country contributes at least one judge to the Court. Th e Court sits in Strasbourg, France.
For a long time, the activities of the two Courts were somewhat distinct and far apart. Th e CJEU dealt with EU matters, and these were mostly economic issues, regulatory issues, issues that concerned the blizzard of rules and regulations out of Brussels, or the specifi c clauses of EU treaties. Th e ECtHR dealt exclusively with human rights; it interpreted the texts of the European Convention. But the lines between the two Courts have blurred considerably, in recent years. More and more, the CJEU has added a human rights annex to its conventional EU work. It has become, in a real sense, a human rights court on its own. And if, as is expected, the EU itself joins the European Convention as a member, then the jurisdictions of the two Courts will become more problematic, the two Courts will become more entangled with each other, and the European jurisprudence of human rights will become more complex. It is, of course, already quite complex.
Th is important book deals with the two Courts, their jurisdictions, their relationships. It closely examines the human rights work of the two Courts. It also addresses some important issues that arise within the general culture of European human rights. Th e book is a valuable guidebook to those who want to understand the two Courts, their human rights work, and how they relate to each other. It is an indispensable aid to those who wish to thread their way through the intricacies of doctrine and procedure -and there are plenty of these intricacies. Th e relationship between the Courts is complicated, and far from static. Th e Courts confront each other, and they also confront, more fundamentally, the institutions and countries they serve. And beyond this, they have obligations to the peoples of Europe who are citizens of the member countries. Th e authors examine the jurisprudence of the Courts. In addition to the more conventional sources, they added interviews with judges and advocates general. Th e result is a richer and fuller picture of the Courts and their culture than we have ever had in the past.
A casual observer might imagine that these two Courts would occupy very divergent cultural spaces. Th ere are, aft er all, some fairly striking diff erences between them. Th e CJEU speaks French. French is its language, and only French. Not surprisingly, its decisions look French. Th ere are no dissents or concurrences; this is the French way. Th e Court speaks with a single voice. Th e decisions are always unanimous. No doubt, before the CJEU reaches its decision, the judges debate and consult among themselves. Perhaps they argue vigorously -in private. But if there are disagreements, they have to be smoothed out. Not a word of them will appear in the public record. Th e voice of the ECtHR, on the other hand, speaks both in English and in French. Th e Court allows dissents and concurrences. Some basic disagreements will be aired in public, on the record. Th e style of the judges of the ECtHR is more personal, more individualistic, than the style of the ECJ judges, who tend to write in a rather dry and formalistic way. Hence the two Courts represent, then, in a way, two quite diff erent legal traditions.
Yet, in a deeper sense, the diff erences mask the fact that the two Courts have, more and more, come to share a single sensibility. Indeed, that is one of the messages of the book: two diff erent personalities, two diff erent procedures. And yet a single, dominant, underlying culture. Th e judges of the two Courts come from many diff erent backgrounds -diff erent countries, diff erent occupations. Some were judges, some were professors, and some were lawyers. But once on the Court, they end up speaking, in a way, the same language. Th is is an important fi nding. Th ese international Courts develop a culture of their own. New judges are socialised into that culture. Th ey become part of the family, so to speak. Th is is true of both Courts. And the cultures of both Courts tend to converge. Th ey become part of a more general culture of human rights, or at least the European version of that culture.
Th e human rights culture is in a way something new -at least in its present form. Th e explosion of ideas and institutions in support of human rights is one of the most startling and fundamental developments of the period since the end of the Second World War. But what exactly do we mean by a human rights culture? Th ere is no simple, obvious defi nition. Th e boundaries are indistinct. Not everybody will agree on any aspect of that culture. But I think we can identify two basic ideas that lie behind the development of a human rights culture: fi rst, that there exist fundamental rights, which belong to everybody everywhere -or should (and by everybody, we mean everybody: men and women, people of all faiths and skin colours, people of all sorts of views and ideas, people who agree with the government, and people who dissent); and second that no government can legitimately violate the basic rights as the rights trump laws, regulations, ordinances, doctrines -anything that violates or contradicts them is illegitimate, and ought not exist. It follows, then, that there has to be some power, some institution or some agency which can enforce human rights against the state. Typically, this is a court. Th e human rights era is thus also the era of constitutions, bills of rights and basic charters -and of constitutional courts, armed with the power of judicial review, courts which have the job of making sure the rights are properly observed.
Many scholars have tried to trace the basic ideas of the human rights culture as far back as possible. Th e usual accounts have generous citations to Immanuel Kant, John Locke and the theorists of the French and American revolutions. Non-Western peoples tell their own stories about the genesis of the human rights culture. Th ey go back into the storehouses of their own traditions. Yet, for most of the world, the fl owering of the human rights culture is in fact surprisingly recent. In the 1940s, virtually all of Europe was under the power of a ruthless band of dictators: Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and Franco. Th e great powers held almost all of Africa and a good deal of Asia in their colonial grip. Th e leading independent power of Asia, Japan, was an aggressive military dictatorship. Autocracy governed most of Latin America. Th ere were plenty of constitutions, but they were, for the most part, pieces of paper, unenforced and unenforceable. Th e Soviet Constitution, for example, was an obvious sham. Judicial review was a rare beast among the world's legal systems. And even in islands of democracy, human rights were not understood the way we understand them today. In Switzerland, for example, half of the adult population -women -had no right to vote. Th e United States, another island of democracy, was in large part an apartheid state.
And today? Today, the club of free, democratic societies has grown amazingly. Dozens of countries have constitutional courts with powers of judicial review, and many of these courts exercise their powers both vigorously and oft en. Women and minorities have made enormous strides toward equality -and not just in theory. It is easy to point to structural landmarks: the European Convention on Human Rights, for example, and the wave of constitution-writing, especially aft er the collapse of the Soviet Empire. But these written documents are just the skeleton, the bony structure of the human rights movement. Th e heart of the movement is cultural. Its source lies somewhere deep in the texture of contemporary society. Its reach is global. Its message reaches into the furthest corners of the most remote inhabited places. Th ere are still dictators and autocratic societies. Hundreds of millions of people can only dream about a human rights regime. But even dictators pay lip service to the human rights culture, and many of them must reckon, constantly, with a growing demand for human rights.
Our authors do not lose sight of this larger truth about the human rights culture. Th e phrase is in the very title of the book. Th ey are aware that volcanic social forces -mysterious and powerful -are what propel these two Courts along the road they are travelling. If recent history is any guide, there is a strong trend in European societies toward expanding human rights, making the meanings broader, more inclusive. Human rights courts have crowded dockets -sometimes disastrously so. Still, the two Courts the authors have studied are, aft er all , courts of law. Doctrine, procedure, technicality and jurisdiction: these things matter, and matter greatly, in the day-to-day work of the Courts. In some situations and cases, the Courts act cautiously, at other times, more boldly. Individual doctrines and decisions make a diff erence. Th e Courts have to worry about local and regional politics. Issues arise which test the competence of the Courts. Jurisdictions and levels of authority can be puzzling. Scholars nag and worry about this or that doctrine or standard. Th ey argue with others in print. Some of the issues remain unresolved. Yet despite all of this, one thing is clear: the human rights culture of the 21st century is a massive reality. Th is culture has deep roots. But it exploded into consciousness in the period aft er the Second World War. And since then it has continued to grow and develop, and to gain new territories for its kingdom.
For anyone who wants to understand that culture, and understand, too, what these two powerful Courts are about, and how they work and interact, this book is an essential and defi nitive guide.
Lawrence M. Friedman Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford University

Aim and Purpose
Th is book is based on a study funded by the Swedish Research Council and recognised by the Stanford Harvard International Junior Faculty Forum, 1 and is aimed at explaining, confi rming, and fostering the European human rights culture. Th is book is located in the fi elds of comparative law and European law. European human rights culture is a political term that was fi rst introduced by Mr. Barroso, president of the European Commission.
2 Is the statement just a political exclamation that lacks judicial support? Problematically, there has been no research yet to defi ne the precise content of this concept and to clarify its meaning for human rights protection as guaranteed by two European Courts. In an original and novel perspective, this book analyses through fi rst hand interviews with members of the European judiciary the judicial perspective on the European human rights culture and sets this in context to the political dimension of the term. As we will see, the European human rights culture is not solid; hence our aim is not to produce an explicit answer on something that is not tangible. Rather, as we will explain, the European human rights culture is a political and judicial hybrid based on the legal cultures in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Th is book fi lls the niche of researching the politically proclaimed term and combines the most recent developments for European human rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 14) with a close study of the European judiciary and their backgrounds when deciding European human rights cases.
Whereas, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), based in Strasbourg, has been classically dealing with human rights protection in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), based in Luxembourg, has mainly taken care of the so-called economic freedoms enshrined in the EU Treaty. Nevertheless, there has been a clear shift in recent years. Indeed, human rights issues in the EU legal order have been maturing immensely under the impulsion of both the case law of the CJEU and also by the adoption of legislation specifi cally concerning the protection of human rights, i.e. the creation of the Human Rights Agency in 2007, and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, providing a legally binding nature to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Th is calls for even more attention to human rights protection by the CJEU as accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is upcoming.
Th e book will uncover a two pull process, that of a judicial and political push towards human rights protection in Europe which -as we will discover -does not pull in the same direction. Rather, the split between the judicial and political notion will be discussed.
To determine the components of the European human rights culture, the book assesses the legal cultures of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. For this, the administrative, procedural and doctrinal basis of the Courts are provided. Most excitingly, fi rst-hand data through interviews with the European judiciary is presented to assess the legal culture of each Court as a foundation of a judicial European human rights culture. Th en, it analyses how this helps to understand the relationship between the two Courts. Th is interaction, or mélange, arguably leads to the formation of a dense European human rights area. Th is cross-fertilisation may also lead to increasing confl icts of interpretation and jurisdiction between the two European legal orders. Hence, this book suggests eff ective solutions to avoid such a confl icting relationship in order to better protect European individuals. In that respect, it appears clear that the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR are the most important sources of European human rights law. Th erefore, the book looks especially at cases dealing with the interaction between the two Courts in the fi elds of human rights. Notably, our book goes beyond looking empirically at the case law only, and will also pay regard to other legal material, such as the treaties, statutes, rules of the court, etc., which all build a framework for the European human rights culture. Nevertheless, the study will provide suggestions for solving the confl icts between the institutions in this new landscape of human rights jurisdiction and involve a close analysis of the relevant new Treaty provisions.
Signifi cance
While there is a wide concern, even within popular discussion, on human rights in Europe, no book has been published to analyse the two Courts' legal culture and to ask about its meaning for the interaction between the Courts. While there are a growing number of studies involving interviews with European judiciary, the special link with human rights culture and the legal culture of both European courts is lacking. Th is book fi lls this gap by relying on an earlier study by one of the authors on the Strasbourg legal culture and combining the analysis with the advanced analysis of the Luxembourg legal culture in order to illustrate the European human rights culture from both a judicial and political perspective.
At the time of the writing, there is no book dealing specifi cally with the European human rights culture and the interaction between the CJEU and the ECtHR. However, it appears clear from the doctrine that fundamental rights in the EU have taken a prominent place in the CJEU case law. Such an assertion is not only visible in the jurisprudence but also in relation to the most recent EU texts, such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Lisbon Treaty. Our dense study of European human rights is useful in light of the coming accession of the EU to the ECHR. It is timely and provides exclusive, fi rst-hand information by judges and advocates general.
A perusal of recent EU law books in the context of fundamental rights points clearly to the inexistence of a monograph on both the CJEU and the ECtHR. It is interesting to note that the contemporary books, though acknowledging the importance of the interaction between the CJEU and the ECtHR, do not analyse thoroughly such a phenomenon. A new book by DeSchutter promises a fulllength overview of the EU as a human rights organisation. 3 Its outline reveals a more general look at the overall organisational structure and does not look at the promoters of European human rights jurisprudence, namely the judges and their understanding of human rights. DeSchutter does not however take a comparative look at both Courts and the legal culture of the judges. In the new book by Craig, EU Administrative Law (2012), one chapter deals with the Charter, the accession and briefl y the relationship between the EU and the ECHR (chapter 16 "Rights", pages 456-486). 4 Also, in the most recent edition of Arnull's book on the European Court of Justice (2006), there is no comprehensive section on this issue. 5 Notably, the Bosphorus case (2005) is discussed in detail. Douglas-Scott wrote about the overlapping areas between the Courts, describing the diff erences of application to the Courts and diff erent administration. She also looks at case law where the Strasbourg Court cites Luxembourg or vice-versa. Aft er describing those cases, she fi nds the CJEU more prone to cite Strasbourg and attests a lack of comparative law methodology in the judgments. 6 Unfortunately, she did not link her interest to the underlying legal culture. A number of recent articles look at the accession, but lack an evaluation of the legal culture and the judges at both Courts. 7 A book from 2007 looks, by way of interviews with judges, at the inside of international courts. 8 While the authors include examples from CJEU and ECtHR judges, they focus on what it is like to serve on international benches and do not have a special interest in European courts or human rights. While supranational tribunals constantly grow in importance, little is known about their legal culture. Th ere exists literature about the European Union, and studies about how EU law has prompted convergence of the domestic legal systems of its member states. 9 One collection of articles looked at examples of diff erent European states and their legal cultures, as well as the integration caused by the EU. 10 An article from 2011 11 employs an analysis of interviews with the CJEU judiciary to show a split between judges, some with a proneness to push human rights forward by use of the EU Charter versus others that are more reluctant. However, the article does not deal with the aspects of accession to the ECHR.
Methodology
De lege lata: Th e book aims to understand the European human rights culture by looking at the interaction between the CJEU and the ECtHR, especially through assessing the existing legal material, interviews and a qualitative analysis. Th e case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR are the most important sources of European human rights law. Th e book will look especially at cases dealing with the interaction between the two Courts in the fi elds of human rights. Our book will go beyond only looking empirically at the case law, but will have regard to all other legal material, such as the treaties, statues, rules of the court, etc. which all build a framework for the European human rights culture. A qualitative analysis of the Courts' legal doctrines and employed rhetoric will also form an important method to assess the European human rights culture. Besides these points de lege lata, the book will raise some points de lege ferenda. Th e book aims at understanding the interaction between the two Courts by also looking at possible fi elds of rivalry and will suggest solutions to this possible confl ict of two overlapping European jurisdictions on human rights.
Combining US/European concepts: Identifying a legal culture is a diffi cult undertaking. Culture is a vague concept and easily criticised. Researching the legal culture of the two Courts is however useful, as it will provide evidence for the term circulated by EU Commission President Barroso and emphasised pre-viously. Legal culture, as defi ned by Lawrence Friedman, is formed by "ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institutions, which some public or some parts of the public holds".
12 While this concept is mainly a concept used in the US, it has its critiques, especially in Europe. Scholars, like Cotterrell, Modéer or Tuori, put more substance to the defi nition by looking at legal doctrine and legal rhetoric. 13 Th e book combines both the US and the European dogmatic approach by building on legal culture as values, ideas and attitudes expressed towards law by the European judiciary in interviews and support it through an analysis of the legal doctrines and rhetoric used in legal documents.
Structured interviews: 27 and 46 diff erent nationalities, respectively, coming together in the Courts -to what extent are national legal backgrounds shaping the legal culture? Th e interview questions focus on their attitudes towards working in the Court and their beliefs on human rights. A special set of interview questions deals with the perceived interaction between the CJEU and the ECHR and their institutional future. Th e interviews are designed, as structured interviews, 14 to show those attitudes and beliefs on human rights and on the interaction between the Courts. Like for the interviews conducted at the ECtHR, 15 
